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FOREWORD
 
This document constitutes Volume 5 of a seven-volume Final 
Reportpre pared by Teledyne Brown Engineering, Huntsville, Alabama, 
under NASA Contract No. NASl0-8676, Launch Site Processing of 
Hazardous Payloads.->This study required a thorough analysis of the 
impact on the launch site and its operations by hazardous Space Shuttle 
payloads., 
The 	seven volumes of the Final Report are as follows: 
Volume 1. "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: This volume presents a 
concise review of the rsults of the study tasks and summarizes the 
principal conclusions and ,recommendations of the study. 
Volume 2. HAZARDOUS PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS: 
This volume presents the results of a survey and an analysis of proposed 
Shuttle payloads to identify hazardous payloads and to define the character­
istics of materials and systems that make them hazardous. This task 
included the development of a haz;dous payloads ranking technique 
and recommendations for processing analysis on selected payloads. 
Volume 3. NORMAL PROCESSING ANALYSIS: This volume 
presents prelimihary normal processing flow plans for three Shuttle 
cargoes selected as a result of the Hazardous Payloads Survey and 
Analysis Task: X 
* •Spacelab 'with Advanced Teclnology Laboratory 
a 	 Tug, Solar Electric Propulsion'Stage, and Synchronous 
Earth Observatory Satellite 
* 	 Interim Upper Stage, and a Pioneer Jupiter Probe with a 
Fluorine Propulsion Unit 
-
The preliminary processing flow plans include identification of 
unique facilities and GSE, processing hazards, and payload safety 
related design criteria. 
Volume 4. CONTINGENCY PROCESSING ANALYSIS: This 
volume presents preliminary alternate processing flow plans for 
contingency situations for the three Shuttle cargoes analyzed ii'the 
Normal Processing Analysis Task. 
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Volume 5. CURRENT PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS: 
This volume presents the results of a survey and an analysis to deter­
mine payloads that are currently flying and that may also fly on the Shuttle 
vehicle when it becomes operational. The analysis determines hazard­
ous materials/systems for each of these current payloads and recom­
mends design and operational safety criteria for each hazardous current 
payload to minimize its impact on the Shuttle Transportation System. 
Volume 6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: This volume presents the results of an 
evaluation of the probable environmental impact of Shuttle payloads 
hazardous materials and includes recommended KSC Environmental 
Impact Statement Pbtential Requirements. 
Volume 7. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS: This 
volume presents a list of special problems identified, in the study that 
require advanced technology study or technology development. 
iv 
*ITELEDYNE 
BROWN 	ENGINEERING, 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
1.0 INTRODUCTION-. ....... ... .. .. .....
 
1.1 TASK OBJECTIVE . .............	 1
 
1. z SCOPE.. 	 ....... . . . . . . .. 1
 
1.3 TASK APPROACH. ...............	 2
 
1.4 SUMMARY OF-RESULTS.. . . . ...... 	 2
 
2.0 CURRENT PAYLOADS & HAZARD IDENTIFICATION . . . . 7
 
2. 	 1 CURRENT PAYLOADS SURVEY AND IDENTI-

FIGATION ....... ................ 7
 
2. 	2 HAZARDOUS SYSTEMS IDENTIFICATION
 
AND CLASSIFICATION . .......... 10
 
3.0 SAFETY CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT ...... . . . .. 11
 
3. 1 	 SAFETY CRITERIA SURVEY .i. . ..... .z 
3. Z 	 APPLICABLE SAFETY CRITERIA FOR 
PAYLOADS . . .... ........ . 13
 
4.0 RECOMMENDED SAFETY CRITERIA FOR CURRENT 
PAYLOADS. . ................. 	 33
 
V 
W'%TELEDYNE
 
BROWN ENGINEERING 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE NO. PAGE 
1 SAFETY CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT 
METHODOLOGY ............. 3 
2 APPLICABLE SAFETY CRITERIA FOR 
CURRENT PAYLOADS ...... ...... 4 
Preceding page blank
 
IMTELEDYNE 
BROWN ENGINEERING 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Payloads containing hazardous materials associated with space 
vehicle launch operations have been recognized and dealt with on previ­
ous R&D space programs. However, when compared to the Shuttle 
Program, these R&D space programs involved relatively few launches 
with considerable time between launches. The Shuttle operational pro­
gram will have a high launch rate and in many cases individual launches 
will have several independent payloads for accomplishment of separate 
missions. Some of these payloads by intent will be recoverable for pur­
pose of reuse, and all must be recoverable in the sense that possible 
abort situations prior to deployment have to be recognized. 
Present processing schedules have been derived assuming 
nominal passive payloads and nominal payload flow.time. A number of 
specifically safety oriented studies on Shuttle payloads have been per -
formed in recent years. However, relatively few of these have treated 
ground operations in depth, and the overall impact of Shuttle payload 
hazards on launch and landing site processing and procedures has not 
been documented. In order to fill this gap, this ten month study was 
initiated in July 1974. The overall study objectives were to uncover and 
determine the hazard potential of Shuttle payloads, develop safety 
oriented normal and contingency launch site processing plans for selected 
cargoes that will minimize the impact on cost and schedules, and pro­
vide for environmental protection. 
1. 1 TASK OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this task is to determine and recommend design 
and operational safety criteria that should be applied to hazardous systems 
of current payloads (flown on unmanned vehicles) that may eventually fly 
on the Space Shuttle. 
1.2 SCOPE 
The scope of this task includes determining those payloads that 
are currently flying or are planned to fly on unmanned vehicles before 
the Shuttle Transportation System (STS) becomes operational and that may 
be flown on the STS. The hazardous materials and systems are to be 
determined for the payloads that fall into this classification (Current 
Payloads). Design and operational safety criteria are to be developed 
for each current payload hazardous material or system to minimize its 
impact on the STS, launch processing, facilities, time, and cos\A 
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1.3 TASK APPROACH 
The first step in this task was to identify current payloads that 
are candidates for flight on the Space Shuttle. The most all inclusive
 
data source for candidate Shuttle payloads was the Level A Summarized
 
NASA Payloads Descriptions of Automated Payloads, July 1974. Since
 
this document only covers planned Shuttle payloads from 1979 forward,
 
additional data sources were 
necessary to identify STS candidates. The 
October 1973 NASA Payloads Model and the July 1973 Space Shuttle 
Traffic Model documents, which cover payload flights from 1973 forward, 
were used to determine the current payloads. 
Using data obtained from these documents and contacts with the 
scientific community, an analysis was performed to determine the 
hazardous materials and systems associated with these payloads. 
Applicable design-and operational safety criteria were then
 
developed from the findings of our normal and contingency processing
 
analysis tasks, available safety studies, and other sources, such as 
NASA Safety Requirements established for payloads to be flown on the 
STS. These safety criteria were grouped according to the type or 
category of hazardous system or element. 
The safety criteria applicable to each of the identified current 
payloads were specified. These safety criteria provide a checklist for 
evaluating the design adequacy from a safety standpoint for those 
current payloads that are candidates for flight on the Shuttle Orbiter. 
A schematic outline of this safety criteria development process is 
presented in Figure 1. 
1.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The payloads listed in Figure 2 are considered current payloads
because they have flown or are scheduled to fly between 1973 and 1980 
and are scheduled to fly during the planned operational phase of the STS. 
The applicable design and operational safety criteria are shown for each 
current payload. 
With the exception of Mini-LAGEOS (OP-03-A) payload, all 
current payloads contain hazardous materials or systems. The Mini-
LAGEOS payload is a passive spherical reflector structure and contains 
no hazardous materials or systems. The remaining 20 current payloads 
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FIGURE 1. SAFETY CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT
 
APPLICABLE SAFETY CRITERIA FOR CURRENT PAYLOADS 
APPLICALE CURRENT PAYLOADS 	 -,,. 
PAYLOAD
 
CODE PAYLOAD NAME
 
AS-0-A Extra Coronal Lyman Alpha Explorer X X X X
 
AS-03-A Cosmic Background Explorer X X X X
 
EO-07-A Advanced Synchronous Meteorological Satellite X X X X
 
EO-08-A Earth Observatory Satellite X X X X X
 
EO-10-A Applications Explorer (Special Purpose Satellite) X X X X X
 
EO-12-A TIROS 10' X X X X X
 
, 	 EO-56-A Environmental Monitoring Satellite X X X X X
 
EO-57-A Foreign Synchronous Meteorological Satellite X X X X
 
EO-58-A Geosynchronous Operational Meteorological Satellite X X X X
 
EO-61-A Earth Resources Survey Operational Satellite X X X X X
 
OP-01-A GEOPAUSE X X X
 
OP-Cl-A Gravity Gadiometer 	 X X X
 
OP-03-A Mini-LAGEOS
 
OP-07-A SEASAT-B X X X X X
 
PL-ZZ-A Pioneer Saturn Probe X X X X X X
 
CN-51-A INTERSAT X X X X X
 
CN-52-A U. S. DOMSAT ' X X X X X
 
CN-53-A U. S. DOMSAT 'BI X X X X X
 
CN-55-A Traffic Management Satellite 	 X X X X X
 
CN-56-A Foreign Communications Satellite A X X x X X
 
CN-58-A U. S. DOMSAT IC' X X X X X
 
FIGURE2. APPLICABLE SAFETY CRITERIA FOR CURRENT PAYLOADS 
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contain hazardous materials or systems. All the hazardous materials 
and systems contained in the current payloads have teen processed at 
KSC in the past. An in-depth design analysis of each of the final designs 
of these current payloads would be required to properly assess the 
degree to which the recommended safety criteria should be applied. 
The applicable safety criteria for each of these current payloads 
give NASA a checklist to evaluate how successful the payload designer 
was in eliminating or reducing the hazards to the STS stemming from the 
hazardous materials and systems on these payloads. 
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2.0 CURRENT PAYLOADS & HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
2. 1 CURRENT PAYLOADS SURVEY AND-IDENTIFICATION 
This survey covered the following payloads that are grouped
by Scientific Discipline and cover space opportunities from 1973 through
1991. The payloads selected for analysis were those freeflying units 
that have flown in 1973 or later and are scheduled for flight after the 
STS becomes operational in 1980. The most inclusive source
 
located was the Level A Summarized NASA Payloads Descriptions of
 
Automated Payloads, July 1974. The sources selected to deter­
mine approved and ongoing as well as planned flights were the October 
1973 NASA Payloads Model and the July 1973 Space Shuttle Traffic 
Model documents. 
ASTRONOMY 
AS-01-A Large Space Telescope 
*AS-OZ-A 
-Extra Coronal Lyman Alpha Explorer 
-AS-03-A Cosmic Background Explorer 
AS-05-A Advanced Radio Explorer 
AS-07-A 3m Ambient Temperature IR Telescope 
AS-l1-A 1. 5m IR Telescope 
AS-13-A UV Survey Telescope 
AS-14-A 1. Om UV-Optical Telescope 
AS-16-A Large Radio Observatory Array (LROA) 
AS --17-A 30m IR Interferometer 
HIGH ENERGY ASTROPHYSICS 
HE-01-A Large X-Ray Telescope Facility
 
HE-03-A Extended X-Ray Survey
 
HE-05-A High Latitude Cosmic Ray Survey
 
HE-07-A Small High Energy Satellite
 
HE-08-A Large High Energy Observatory A (Gamma Ray) 
HE-09-A Large High Energy Observatory B (Magnetic 
Spectrometer) 
HE-10-A Large High Energy Observatory G (Nuclear 
Calorimeter) 
HE-i1-A Large High Energy Observatory D (I. Zm X-Ray 
Telescope) 
HE-IZ-A Cosmic Ray Laboratory 
*Current Payload 
SPrecedingp 
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SOLAR PHYSICS. 
SO-02-A Large Solar Observatory
 
SO-03-A Solar Maximum Mission
 
ATMOSPHERIC AND SPACE PHYSICS 
AP-01-A Upper Atmosphere Explorer 
AP-02-A Medium Altitude Explorer 
AP-03-A High Altitude Explorer 
AP-04-A Gravity and Relativity Satellite - LEO 
AP-05-A Environmental Perturbation Satellite - Mission A 
AP-06-A Gravity and Relativity Satellite - Solar 
AP-07-A Environmental Perturbation Satellite - Mission B 
AP-08-A - Heliocentric and Interstellar Spacecraft 
EARTH OBSERVATIONS 
*EO-07-A Advanced Synchronous Meteorological Satellite 
*EO-08-A Earth Observatory Satellite 
EO-09-A Synchronous Earth Observatory Satellite 
*EO-10-A Applications Explorer (Special Purpose Satellite) 
*EO-lZ-A TIROS '0' 
*EO-56-A Environmental Monitoring Satellite 
*EO-57-A Foreign Synchronous Meteorological Satellite 
*EO-58-A Geosynchronous Operational Meteorological 
Satellite 
EO-59-A Geosynchronous Earth Resources Satellite 
*EO-61-A Earth Resources Survey Operational Satellite 
EO-6Z-A Foreign Synchronous Earth Observatory Satellite 
EARTH AND OCEAN PHYSICS 
*OP-0-A GEOPAUSE
 
*OP-02-A Gravity Gradiometer
 
*OP -03 -A Mini -LAGEOS
 
OP-04-A GRAVSAT 
OP-05-A Vector Magnetometer Satellite 
OP-06-A Magnetic Field Monitor Satellite 
*OP-07-A SEASAT-B 
OP-51-A Global Earth & Ocean Monitor System 
*Cur rent Payload 
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SPACE PROCESSING APPLICATIONS 
SP-01-A Space Processing Free-Flyer 
LIFE SCIENCES 
LS-0Z-A Biomedical Experiment Scientific Satellite 
SPACE TECHNOLOGY 
ST-01-A 
PLANETARY 
PL-01-A 

PL-02-A 

PL-03-A 

PL-07-A 

PL-08-A 

PL-09-A 

PL-10-A 

PL-11-A 

PL-lZ-A 

PL-13-A 
PL-14-A 

PL-15-A 

PL-16-A 

PL-18-A 

PL-19-A 

PL-20-A 

*PL-ZZ-A 
Long Duration Exposure Facility 
Mars Surface Sample Return 
Mars Satellite Sample Return 
Pioneer Venus Multiprobe 
Venus Orbital Imaging Radar 
Venus Buoyancy Probe 
Mercury Orbiter 
Venus Large Lander
 
Pioneer Saturn/Uranus Flyby 
Mariner Jupiter Orbiter 
Pioneer Jupiter Probe 
Saturn Orbiter 
Uranus Probe/Neptune Flyby 
Ganymede Orbiter/Lander 
Encke. Rendezvous 
Halley Comet Flyby 
Asteroid Rendezvous 
Pioneer Saturn Probe 
COMMUNICATIONS/NAVIGATION
 
*CN-51-A 
*CN-52-A 
*CN-53-A 
CN-54-A 
*CN-55 -A 
*CN-56-A 
*CN-58-A 
CN-59-A 
CN-60-A 
*Current Payload 
INTERSAT 
U. S. DOMSAT 'A' 
U, s. DOMSAT 'B' 
Disaster Warning Satellite 
Traffic Management Satellite 
Foreign Communications Satellite A 
U. S. DOMSAT 'C' 
Communications R&D/Prototype Satellite 
Foreign Communications Satellite B 
9
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LUNAR 
LU-01-A Lunar Orbiter
 
LU-O2-A Lunar Rover
 
LU-03-A Lunar Halo Satellite
 
LU-04-A Lunar Sample Return
 
2.2 HAZARDOUS SYSTEMS IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION 
Each payload classified as a current payload was analyzed to 
determine its hazardous systems and materials. This analysis was 
performed as part of the Hazardous Payloads Survey and Analysis Task 
that is included in Volume 2. The results of this analysis for the 21 
current payloads are included in Section 4. 0. 
The hazardous materials and systems contained in the curzent 
payloads were grouped into six categories. The individual categories 
were established based on similarity of design features, similarity of 
hazardous effects, similarity in operational precautions, and convenience 
in assembling safety criteria: 
* Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
* Electrical 
* Pyrotechnics and Solid Propellant Motors 
* Liquid/Gas Propulsion 
* Toxic Fluids/Gases 
* General. 
10
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3.0 SAFETY CRITERIA DEVELOPM.ENT 
A literature search was made to locate information, reports, 
studies, etc., that could tentatively have an applicability to the identified 
current payloads. Those sources pertinent to the problem are shown 
in Section 3. 1. Requirements, guidelines, ground rules, and criteria 
were extracted from these volumes based on their cursory application 
to the current payloads. That is, the current payloads hazard types 
were compared or matched to the source information, and those con­
sidered relevant were compiled into a tentative safety criteria package. 
From the normal and contingency processing analysis and the 
hazards analysis (Volumes 3"and 4), a set of basic facility and opera­
tional and design requirements was derived for the three cargoes 
analyzed. 
The tentative safety criteria derived from matching the current 
payloads against the safety literature was further matched against the 
safety requirements for the three cargoes. This was a process of 
synthesizing a new and more gerinain set of criteria that bears direct 
applicability to current payloads. The information or criteria that 
were considered not to apply to the current payloads hazard types were 
disregarded in the final set of criteria. Applicable criteria were separated 
into three groups: 
* Design Safety Criteria 
* Operational Safety Criteria 
* General Payloads Safety Criteria. 
The first two groups were further separated into the following: 
* Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator, 
* Electrical 
* Pyrotechnics 
* Liquid/Gas Propulsion and Auxiliary Propulsion Equipment 
* Toxic Fluids/Gases. 
i11
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The third group, General Payloads Safety Criteria, is not hazard-type 
oriented like the design and operational safety criteria but is applicable 
to payloads. 
3. 1 SAFETY CRITERIA SURVEY 
A review of available safety oriented documents and reports was 
conducted to evaluate the extent of their applicability in developing design 
and operational safety criteria for current payloads to be flown on the 
STS. Some of,the documents reviewed are: 
* 	 Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the 
National Space Transportation System Prepared by 
Payload Safety Steering Group - NASAHeadquarters, Code MQ 
* 	 Kennedy Space Center General Safety Plan,
 
Kennedy Space Center - KMI 1710. lB/SF
 
* 	 Kennedy Space Center Safety Practices Handbook 
Kennedy Space Center - KHB 1710. Z/SF 
* 	 Range Safety Manual - Volume I 
Headquarters, Air Force Eastern Test Range 
AFETRM IZ7-1 
* 	 Radiation Protection Handbook
 
Kennedy Space Center - KHB 1860. I/IS
 
* 	 Feasibility of Space Disposal of Radioactive Nuclear 
Waste Volume I and II - Lewis Research Center 
NASA TM X-Z911 and X-Z91Z 
* 	 Recording and Cataloging Hazards Information -
Revision A - Marshall Space Flight Center -
NASA TM X-64782 
* 	 Manned Space Flight Nuclear Systems Safety Volumes IV & 
V - General Electric - 7ZSD4Z01-1, Contract No. NAS8-26283 
* 	 Shuttle Payload Ground Operations Safety Handbook 
TRW Contract No. NAS10-8583 
* 	 Safety in Earth Orbit Study - Volumes I, II and V
 
North American Rockwell - SD.72-SA-0094
 
Contract No. NAS9-12004
 
12 
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* 	 Space Shuttle Program Safety and Reliability Design Note -
Hazardous Energy Sources 
McDonnell Douglas Design Note No. I-EAST-S&R-6 
* 	 Advanced Missions Study - Volume II: Technical 
Discussion - Aerospace Corporation - ATR-72 (7316-01)-i 
Volume II, Part Z and Volume III, Part Z - Contract 
No. NASw-2301 
* 	 Advanced Missions Safety - Volume II: Technical 
Discussion - Aerospace Corporation - ATR-7Z (7316-01)-1 
Volume I[-2 - Contract No. NASw-2301 
* 	 Shuttle Orbiter Applications and Requirements (SOAR I) 
Vol. XI, McDonnell Douglas, Contract No. NAS8-28583 
3. 2 APPLICABLE SAFETY CRITERIA FOR PAYLOADS 
The safety criteria for the hazardous materials and systems 
uncovered in performing the current payloads safety analysis were 
grouped into the following: 
* 	 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
* 	 Electrical 
* 	 Pyrotechnics and Solid Propellant Motors 
* 	 Liquid/Gas Propulsion and Auxiliary Propulsion Systems 
* 	 Toxic Fluids/Gases 
Pyrotechnics and solid propellant motors were grouped together 
because much of the initiating. circuitry requirements is the same. For 
similiar reasons, primary and auxiliary propulsion design and opera­
tional safety criteria are grouped together. A special section (Para­
graphs 3. 2. 1 through 3. Z. 6) on the design and operational safety criteria 
for toxic fluids was deemed necessary because some propellants used in 
the main and auxiliary propulsion systems of the current payloads are 
toxic. 
13
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The applicable safety criteria for current payloads is speci­
fied in Section 4. 0. An in-depth design analysis and trade study for 
each of these current payloads will be required to properly assess the 
degree to which the safety criteria should be implemented. 
3. Z. 	1 RTG Safety Criteria 
3. Z. 	1. 1 RTG Design Criteria 
* 	 A redundant active RTG cooling system shall be provided 
within the Shuttle cargo bay to be operable on ascent and 
return/reentry and to be operable at the launch and 
landing sites with ground supplied coolant. 
* 	 Blast overpressure and fragmentation protection shall 
be adequate to ensure containment of all radioactive 
material in the event of an accident. 
* 	 Fireball protection shall be adequate to ensure contain­
ment of all radioactive material in the event of an acci­
dent. 
* 	 Redundant temperature control shall be provided for 
radioactive materials where such temperature control is 
required. 
* 	 The RTG design shall provide for safe (both normal and 
emergency) handling during ground or flight operations. 
* 	 Shielding shall be provided to reduce the exposure of the 
flight and ground crews and equipment to thermal and 
nuclear radiation from radioactive materials within 
RTG's. 
* 	 Fire alarms and other protection systems capable of 
supporting RTG's shall be provided during storage, 
testing, transportation, and at the launch pad. 
* 	 RTG systems shall provide a redundant and completely 
independent method for ground and flight monitoring 
to detect radiation leakage and assess thermal perfor­
mance and pressures of the heat transfer loop. 
14
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* 	 The largest practical physical separation between the 
RTG, the Orbiter cabin, and critical systems sensitive 
to radiatibn shall be provided: 
3. 2. 	 1. Z RTG Operational Criteria 
* 	 Personnel assigned to work areas containing radioactive 
materials/devices shali not be routinely exposed to 
ionizing radiation in excess of the current KSC radiation 
protection standard KHB 1860. i/s. 
* 	 Operations that at any time place the crew in the near 
vicinity of a radioactive heat source shall be avoided or 
at least limited. 
* 	 Certified operational plans to receive and store RTG's 
and check out power systems and components shall be 
provided. 
" 	 Quick retrieval operations to remove RTG's during an 
emergency shall be developed. 
* 	 Procedures for cooling the RTG's during all phases of 
the Shuttle ground operations shall be provided. 
* 	 RTG's shall be installed in the Shuttle cargo bay at the 
last practicable point in the launch countdown sequence. 
* 	 Ground crew training with confirmed procedures in the 
use of system monitoring equipment shall be provided. 
* 	 Suitable personnel exclusion area shall be provided at 
launch and landing sites. 
* 	 Emergency procedures and decisions (contingency plans) 
for emergency situations involving RTG hardware shall 
be established. 
* 	 Certified installation and removal equipment and pro ­
cedures to handle RTG's shall be provided. 
15
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3. 2. 	Z Electrical Safety Criteria 
3. 2. 	2. 1 Electrical Design Criteria 
Payload battery cases shall be capable of withstanding 
internal overpressures in the worst case (i.e., terminal­
to -terminal short with the relief valve closed) and 
pressure differences during Orbiter descent without 
rupturing.
 
* 	 Payload batteries shall have the case vented through 
relief valves into the Orbiter overboard venting 
system. 
* 	 Payload circuits shall be designed with overload 
protection to prevent fires. 
* 	 Payloads shall have a means of shutting off their 
electrical power under emergency conditions. 
* 	 Payload electrical wiring must not be routed near 
sharp edges.
 
*-	 Payload electrical wiring must not be in contact with 
flammable fluids or materials. 
* 	 Payload equipment containing high voltages must 
be designed to prevent electrical shock hazards. 
* 	 Electrical umbilical disconnects between the payload 
and the Orbiter shall be separated from hazardous­
fluid disconnects, and shall be qualified as explosion 
proof. 
* 	 Payloads should be grounded to other cargo structures 
'to prevent electrostatic charge buildup and an elec­
trical shock hazard. Within the payload, grounding 
shall be such as to preclude an electrical shock. A 
positive ground shall exist from the payload to the 
Orbiter structure. 
16
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* 	 Payload safety critical electrical and electronic com­
ponents shall be potted, hermetically sealed, or similarly 
protected against the effects of liquid leakage, moisture, 
condensation, vibration, and arcing contacts. 
* 	 The return of current to the power source shall be 
accomplished by means other than the payload structure. 
* 	 Secondary power sources for safety critical payload 
functions shall be provided. 
* 	 Safety critical redundant payload electrical circuits shall 
not be routed through the same connector. 
* 	 Safety critical payload control circuits shall be capable 
of being verified. 
* 	 Positive identification and adequate protection from 
inadvertent operation shall be provided for safety 
critical payload switches. Identical safety critical 
switches shall not be located in close proximity to each 
other. 
" 	 Provisions shall be included for payload caution and 
warning functions that will provide both audible and 
visual warnings to the Orbiter crew to hazardous situations 
while the payload is aboard the Orbiter. 
* 	 Components containing mercury shall not be used for 
payload equipment to be installed in the Orbiter cabin. 
When used otherwise it shall be double contained. 
3. 2. 	2. 2' Electrical Operational Criteria 
* 	 Inspection and test records of required safety device 
verifications and status inspections (of insulation material, 
etc.) shall be maintained. 
* 	 A record of payload equipment calibration, including 
test equipment and tools, shall be maintained. 
a 	 All payload lockout devices, warning signs and safety 
interlocks shall be deployed/activated before commencing 
operations involving electrical power capable of causing 
equipment damage or personnel injury. 
17 
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" 	 Initial power application and component functional tests 
shall be made following major maintenance and repair 
operations to payload equipment. 
* 	 Payload electrical equipment components and conductors 
shall be identified per the NEC or MIL standards, as 
appropriate. 
* 	 No equipment used to test payloads, including meters and 
tools, shall be used beyond calibration and test expiration 
date s. 
* 	 Payload ordnance material or ordnance igniting devices 
shall not be exposed to RF energy. 
* 	 Fueled payloads shall not be exposed to RF energy levels 
greater than 5 mW/rcm 2 . 
* 	 Areas in which personnel are located shall not be exposed 
to RF energy levels greater than 10 mW/cm2 . 
3. Z. 3 Pyrotechnic and Solid Propellant Motors Safety Criteria 
3. 2. 	3.1 Pyrotechnic and Solid Propellant Motor Design Criteria 
* 	 The standard Manned Space Flight Initiator, which meets 
reliability and safety requirements for the Space Shuttle, 
or any initiator meeting the requirements of JSC 08060, 
Space Shuttle System Pyrotechnic Specification, or 
MIL STD 151Z shall be used on payloads. 
* 	 Payloads employing Exploding Bridgewires (EBW' s) must 
include a dual bleed system for capacitor charge, a remote 
monitoring of capacitor charge status, and a positive 
means of interrupting the capacitor charging circuit and 
the trigger circuit. 
* 	 Safety critical payload pyrotechnic devices shall permit 
charge verification, e. g. , neutron-ray inspection. 
* 	 Sequence logic and pyrotechnic firing circuits of the pay­
load shall be capable of sustaining a failure without 
causing a hazard to the flight crew or damage to the 
Orbiter or other payloads. Payload pyrotechnic logic
circuits shall receive power from a source other than the 
pyrotechnic batteries. 
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* 	 To ensure firing of safety critical payload pyrotechnic 
devices in parallel, the design of pyrotechnic circuits 
must prevent constant power drain in the event that the 
device short circuits upon activation. 
* 	 Payload pyrotechnics shall meet the handling, installation, 
checkout, and operational requirements of Range Safety 
Manuals, AFETRM 127-1 and A.FWTRM 127-1. 
* 	 Arming of payload pyrotechnic devices shall be pro­
tected against accidental operation. 
* 	 Payload pyrotechnic initiation circuits shall be routed 
separately from power circuits. 
* 	 Payload pyrotechnic firing circuits shall be protected 
from electrostatic -charge buildup. 
* 	 Payload pyrotechnic initiator electrical leads must be 
twisted, shielded pairs. This applies from the first 
safety open point beyond the power source to the ordnance 
item itself. There must be no electrical discontinuity 
or gaps in the shield, including continuity to the outer case, 
* 	 Safety design features, suchas interlocks, redundancy, 
grounding, and isolation devices, shall be incorporated so 
that no single detectable failure or combination of 
undetectable failures shall result in premature detonation 
of explosive payload devices. 
* 	 Provisions shall be made for saing on command of unused 
explosive devices aboard the payload and safing verifica­
tion 	sent to the Orbiter prior to retrieval. 
* 	 Payload safing devices should be located such that ground 
crews have easy access to them after the payload is 
installed in the Orbiter. 
* 	 Solid propellant motors shall be designed so that the 
primary initiating devices can be easily removed/installed 
at the launch site. 
* 	 Solid propellant motors shall utilize a safe and arm 
device as the controlled safing device. 
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3. Z. 3. 2 Pyrotechnic and Solid Propellant Motors Operational Criteria 
* 	 Squibs, detonators, initiators, and other electro­
explosive devices, when removed from standard packing, 
shall be transported in and remain in metal or metal­
lined containers until actually installed in the payload. 
* 	 Nonconductive, static-producing materials shall not be 
used in the packaging of explosive components. 
* 	 Electro-Explosive Devices (EED) shall be properly 
shorted pin-to-pin and pin-to-case unless protected by 
a Faraday cage when shipped to the launch site. 
* 	 Packages containing explosives shall be marked in 
accordance with Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
Regulation No. 15. 
* 	 Explosives shall be delivered to the launch complex or 
designated assembly area by authorized representatives 
of the launch support service contractor only after the 
concurrence of KSC Safety. 
* 	 Explosives shall not be handled when an electrical storm 
is imminent. 
* 	 Spark-proof tools shall be used when working with exposed 
propellants or explosives. 
* 	 All explosive materials used at the launch site shall be 
stored, inspected, and tested only in facilities designated 
and approved by the Safety Office. Explosives shall not 
be stored in (or delivered to) unauthorized areas. 
" 	 Work on explosive items shall be performed only in 
facilities specifically designated for that purpose. 
* 	 The EED s shall be installed as late in the countdown 
or prelaunch activities as is practical. 
* 	 Only essential personnel shall be present during EED 
installation and electrical connection. 
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* 	 All space vehicle RF equipment shall be OFF before 
electrically connecting EED's. 
* 	 Before electrically connecting EED's, "no-voltage" 
checks shall be made, both pin-to-pin and pin-to-case. 
* 	 All employees shall wear conductive footwear (legstats 
are acceptable when used properly) and stand on grounded 
conductive surfaces while handling Category A devices. 
* 	 Electrical circuit test equipment used for testing 
explosive ordnance items, pyrotechnic devices, or 
circuits connected to these items prior to or after 
installation shall be approved by the Safety Office. 
Mechanical and electrical prints of the test equipment, 
with a brief description of their function, shall be sub­
mitted to the Safety Office for approval. 
* 	 Solid propellant motors (except for small solid propellant 
motors with built-in igniters) must not arrive at the 
launch site with the primary initiating device installed. 
Small solid propellant motors vith built-in igniters must 
employ a means to ensure that premature ignition cannot 
occur. 
* 	 Solid propellant motors must not be shipped to the launch 
site with the grain exposed. 
* 	 Solid propellant motors used on payloads shall be 
adequately tested and assigned the appropriate hazard 
classifications prior to arrival at the launch site. 
3.2.4 Liquid/Gas Propulsion Safety Criteria 
3. 2.4. 1 Liquid/Gas Propulsion Design Criteria 
* 	 Payload propellant tank and pressure vessel design factors 
of safety shall be based.either on overpressure or fracture 
mechanics and shall be at least as conservative as the 
design factors of safety called out. Fatigue criteria shall 
be based on life cycle requirements for individual payloads. 
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* 	 Pressure vessels shall be fragmentation-proof, i. e. ,
 
leak before burst, or be provided with fragmentation­
proof container barriers. (If tank pressures during pre­
launch through deployment operations are kept below the
 
maximum operating pressure, these requirements may 
be relaxed appropriately.) Vessels and exterior pres­
sure lines shall be clearly coded to identify content and 
operations pressure; this applies also to interior pres­
sure lines that are accessible through access doors. 
* 	 Payloads shall not have structures that depend on tank 
pressure for structural stabilization where Shuttle 
damage could result if the tank pressurization were lost. 
* 	 Payloads must not generate forces, impulses or momentum 
changes that will produce adverse effects beyond the Orbiter 
GN&C capability while aboard the Orbiter or the IUS .or Tug 
-control capability (i. e. , fluid sloshing in partly filled tanks). 
* 	 Payload leakage sources shall be minimized by use of all 
welded or brazed construction where practical. 
* 	 Payload cryogen tank thermal protection systems shall be 
designed to minimize (below ignition regimes) accumulation 
of flammable fluids resulting from propellant system leakage. 
* 	 To avoid formation of liquid air, the outer surfaces of pay­
load cryogen tank systems that are exposed to the Orbiter 
payload bay environment on the ground or in the lower 
atmosphere shall be properly insulated and/or purged. 
* -Hazardous materials shall not be released or ejected into 
the payload bay from payloads. Venting, relief, and release 
of material from payloads shall be designed to use the Orbiter 
provided vent system. Control of the venting by the Orbiter 
for certain mission phases may be required. Relief of inert 
gases under some conditions may be permitted. 
* 	 A capability shall be provided for dumping liquid propellants 
of propulsion stages and relief of pressurants overboard 
through the Orbiter dump and vent systems. This shall be 
accomplished within the time constraints imposed by abort 
and shall be applicable with the payload doors open or 
closed. 
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* Relief/vent capability for payload pressurized tanks
 
shall be provided to automatically limit maximum
 
pressure. Relief/vent shall be to atmosphere 
unless 
gases/fumes are toxic or flammable. Relief/venting 
shall be designed to prevent mixing of mutually reactive 
fluids/gases. 
* 	 Capability shall be provided to monitor payload fluid and 
gas 	pressures and temperatures.
 
* 
 No single operation shall result in flow of propellant through 
the payload propulsion system. The Auxiliary Propulsion
System (APS) shall be inhibited while in the Orbiter payload bay. 
* 	 Interlocks shall be provided to prevent inadevertent 
operations of the payload while in the Orbiter payload

bay or during the deployment phase of operation.
 
* 	 Payload valve control events shall not be initiated by
 
flight and crash landing loads.
 
* 	 Payload propellant isolation valves shall be provided 
upstream from all start valves. 
* 	 Payload APS shall be capable of being shut down by one 
command from either ground or Orbiter control; 
* 	 Provisions shall be made to verify completion of main
 
engine propulsion system safing prior to retrieval.
 
* 	 Separate fill, drain, and vent lines distinctly marked 
and keyed shall be provided for the transfer of fuel and
oxidizer. They shall be effectively isolated or separated 
by a sufficient distance to prevent mixing of reactant 
fluids. 
* 	 Payload propellant drain and vent interface with the 
Orbiter shall permit payload main propulsion system

propellant venting, and emergency detanking (whether
 
Orbiter is in horizontal or vertical attitude) with the
 
Orbiter payload bay doors closed or open. 
Z3
 
iWTELEDYNE 
BROWN ENGINEERING 
* 	 Payload fluid fill, drain, and vent umbilical disconnects 
shall have positive sealing at disconnect, whether the 
action is intentional or accidental Dual valving shall 
be provided to ensure emergency drain if one valve 
should fail. 
* 	 Flexible sections of high pressure payload gas lines and 
vent lines must be restrained to preclude a line rupture 
from producing line whipping with consequent damage to 
equipment or injury to personnel. 
3. 2. 	4. Z Liquid/Gas Propulsion Operational Criteria 
* 	 Payloads shall be received with redline limits for mission 
rules and procedures, including those applicable to 
emergency conditions that require payload jettison, 
hazardous fluids and pressurant dump, and hazardous 
system safing for mission abort. 
* 	 Mutually reactive fluids shall not be loaded into payloads 
or handled simultaneously. 
* 	 GSE to payload transfer lines shall be purged and cleaned 
following the transfer of hazardous fluids and before 
breaking of connections. 
* 	 Integrated checkout and testing of safety critical payload 
systems shall be conducted prior to integrating into a 
cargo and verified after installation into the Orbiter. 
* 	 Cleanliness requirements and fluid contamination for 
payload propellants and propellant systems shall be 
controlled and monitored. 
* 	 Payload shall not have AlPS and main engine pressurants 
onboard while being unloaded from or loaded in the 
Orbiter. 
* Payload pressurized systems. shall have a maximum 
operating pressure leak check before installation into 
the Orbiter payload bay. 
* 	 Propellant tank pressures, where practical, shall not be 
increased to operational values until deployment from 
the 	Orbiter. 
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* 	 For pressure vessels designed using the factor of safety 
approach, personnel shall be evacuated for the first 
pressurization exceeding 25 percent of design burst 
pressure, subsequent pressurizations exceeding previous 
initial pressures, and any pressurization exceeding 
50 percent of design burst pressure. Whenever pressure
 
levels exceed 25 percent of design burst pressure in a 
vessel containing hazardous fluids (gaseous oxygen is 
excluded), the operation must be performed remotely. 
Design burst pressure values shall be based on the 
temperatures at which the pressure tests on the vessels 
will be conducted. A stabilization period of at least 
5 min must be observed for all remote pressuri­
zations before entry to the test area will be permitted. 
* 	 For pressure vessels designed using the fracture mechan­
ics approach, personnel shall be evacuated for the first 
pressurization exceeding 50 percent of the operating 
pressure; subsequent pressurizations up to operating 
pressure can be performed without personnel evacuation 
at the discretion of the KSC Safety Office. A stabilization 
period of at least 5 min must be observed for all 
remote pressurizations before entry to the test area is 
permitted. In the event that the operating pressure must 
be exceeded, engineering analysis and appropriate test 
data must be submitted for approval of the Launch Opera­
tions Directorate and concurrence of the KSC Safety 
Office. 
* 	 For each payload pressure vessel, a log shall be 
established and kept current, recording its test history 
and exposure to various fluids. This log becomes a 
part of the data package for that particular payload. 
* 	 Pressure vessels and systems shall be exposed only to 
those fluids that have been demonstrated to be com­
patible with the vessel and system materials. 
3.2. 	5 Toxic Fluids/Gases Operational Safety Criteria 
* 	 Hazardous material identification, including dosage limit­
ations and precautionary measures required for handling, 
shall be posted in applicable, areas. 
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* 	 All payload personnel that will be near toxic materials 
when performing their jobs are required to satisfactorily 
complete the KSC safety training course applicable for 
the toxic material. 
A system for personnel access control shall be instituted* 
for those areas where toxic materials are stored and/or 
used. 
* 	 Operations involving toxic chemicals shall not be per­
formed by one man alone. Such operations shall be 
conducted by two or more personnel using the buddy 
system. 
/ 
Personnel engaged in handling and transferring toxic* 
chemicals shall wear approved protective clothing and 
respiratory equipment. 
Emergency and per sonal protective equipment shall be 
placed in easily accessible locations. 
* 
* 	 Protective equipment shall be kept where hazardous
 
material is stored, handled, or used.
 
of emergency pro­* 	 Personnel shall be trained in the use 
tective equipment and procedures. 
* 	 Supervisors shall ensure that personnel are familiar with 
First Aid procedures for the specific hazards with 
which they are associated. 
Safety showers and eye-wash fountains shall be operable" 
before any operation involving a toxic material begins. 
shall be marked to* 	 All containers of toxic chemicals 
indicate their contents. Where the attitude of a portable 
container is critical, it shall be marked to show the 
position to be maintained. 
Equipment and piping containing toxic materials shall be 
identified. 
* 
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* Spills of toxic liquids shall be cleaned up immediately. 
Where necessary, decontamination shall be accomplished 
as soon as possible. 
* 	 Propellant systems shall be leak tested at the launch site 
before loading toxic and/or hazardous fluids and gases, 
unless acceptable certification is submitted. 
* 	 Propellant transfer lines, including double-walled lines, 
shall be drained and purged after the transfer of hazard­
ous fluids and before breaking plumbing connections to 
preclude the escape of hazardous/toxic fluids/gases. 
* The cleanliness of all propellants and materials/com­
ponents in normal contact with the fluids/gases shall be 
controlled to prevent spontaneous decomposition/ignition 
in normal and emergency operational use. 
" 	 Mutually reactive fluids/gases shall not be transferred/ 
loaded or handled simultaneously except when handled as 
a preloaded package/module. 
* 	 Tanking of highly toxic or cryogenic liquid propellants 
aboard a payloa'd 'vehicle must be performed as late as 
possible during launch preparations. 
* 	 Water shall be available for decontamination of area and 
personnel.
 
* 	 No spark or flame producing devices shall be permitted 
in propellant areas. 
* 	 Vapor sensors shall be operational. 
3. z. 	6 General Safety Requirements 
The following general safety criteria are applicable to all the 
hazardous current payloads. 
* 	 Payloads that contain radioactive materials or contain equip­
ment that generates ionizing radiation shall be identified and 
approval obtained for their use. The initial description shall 
state source type, strength/quantity, containment/ shielding, 
and chemical/physical form. Review will be implemented 
through the NASA center responsible for development of the 
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payload. In the event that a NASA center is not involved 
in the development, review will be implemented by the 
Safety Office of the STS operations organization. Major 
radioactive sources require approval by the Interagency 
Aerospace Nuclear Safety Review Panel through the NASA 
coordinator for the Panel. Reference to be used for 
isotope SNAP devices is NASA/AEC Interagency Agree­
ment 1052.7ZA. 
* 	 Provisions against payload-generated hazards shall be 
provided for STS safety while the payload is near to or 
installed in any element of the STS and for personnel, 
equipment, and facility safety during ground operations. 
(In view of Shuttle's abort capability, expendable payloads 
are subject to this requirement through Orbiter landing 
and post -landing operations.) 
* 	 A safe interface between the STS elements, payloads, 
and GSE shall be maintained under nominal, contingency, 
and emergency operations of either the STS, GSE, or 
payloads. The interface during attached and/or detached 
operations shall be designed fail safe. - At least two pro­
cedural operations shall be required for initiation of 
safety-critical functions. ' A mishap shall not result from 
any 	single procedural error. 
* 	 The capability shall be provided for redundant transmittal 
to the Orbiter Caution and Warning System that payload 
data are critical to the safety of the STS or its flight personnel. 
The redundancy may be accomplished via hardwires 
and/or via the Orbiter Performanice Monitoring Function 
(PMF) and includes redundant sensors. The parameters 
to be transmitted and monitored will be identified by the 
user. Appropriate controls for safing the payload or 
operationally-required "command override" of safety­
critical functions will also be identified by the user. 
* 	 Payload safety-critical data and control functions shall 
be capable of being tested for proper functioning from the 
Orbiter. This checkout may not include stimuli or 
calibration of sensor elements where complexities make 
this impractical. 
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* 	 Safety-critical redundant equipment shall be separated 
to prevent hazard propagation to the maximum extent 
possible. 
* 	 The payload shall be designed, or protection provided, 
to preclude hazards to the flight personnel under crash­
landing loads. (Crash-landing loads are defined in 
Space Shuttle Payload Accommodation Handbook.) 
* 	 Where hazards can occur because of the presence or contact 
of mutually-incompatible materials, such components or 
substances shall be separated to the maximum practical 
extent.
 
* 	 To the maximum extent possible, flammable materials 
shall be separated to prevent flame propagation paths. 
Similarly, separation of flammable materials from 
possible ignition sources is required to the maximum 
extent possible. 
* 	 Hazardous materials shall not be released or ejected into 
the payload bay from payloads. Venting, relief, and 
release of material from payloads shall be designed to 
use the Orbiter-provided vent system. Control of the 
venting by the Orbiter for certain mission phases may be 
required. Relief of inert gases under some conditions 
may be permitted. A capability shall be provided for 
dumping liquid propellants of propulsion stages and relief 
of pressurants overboard through the Orbiter dump and 
vent systems. This shall be accomplished within the time 
constraints imposed by abort and shall be applicable with 
the payload doors open or closed. 
* 	 Use of stress -corrosion-susceptible materials in payload 
mounting or support bracketry should be avoided to 
minimize possible safety hazards created by structural 
failure of these elements. 
* 	 Pressure vessels shall be in accordance with NASA
 
Aerospace Pressure Vessel Safety Standard NSS HP 1740. 1 
or in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure .Vessel 
Code. 
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* 	 Prior-to installation of any payload safety-critical equip­
ment into the Orbiter, the equipment shall have been 
satisfactorily verified for the expected operational 
regimes. Analysis and/or test are two techniques for 
such verification. 
* 	 Payloads that have flown on previous flights shall be 
verified for: 
--	 Correction of any safety deficiency encountered on 
previous missions 
-'-	 Safety impact of any changes made to the hardware 
or operation procedures. 
--	 Any maintenance and/or refurbishment affecting 
safety.
 
-- Appropriate design features for reuse or reflying. 
* 	 Payload design and operations shall not impose restric­
tions on normal or contingent Space Shuttle operations 
(including intact abort and rescue operations) in which 
the safety of the STS or flight personnel may be affected. 
* 	 Contingency safety planning (emergency or "backoutpro­
cedures:) for ground oi flight anomalies involving Shuttle 
payloads shall be developed. 
* 	 Destruct systems shall not be used on the current pay­
loads identified by this task when flown on the Shuttle 
*Orbiter. 
All safety-critical command and control circuitry 
associated with eng-ine firing, primary propulsion systems, 
or auxiliary propulsion systems shall be designed to be 
fail operational/fail safe to preclude inadvertent firings 
in case of initial hardware failures. 
Any hardware that is deployed in orbit past the Payload 
Bay doors mold line shall have a redundant retraction or 
a jettison capability that can be initiated from pressurized 
compartments (not requiring EVA). 
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* Reusable payloads shall include provisions to permit 
preretrieval safing to be verified by the Orbiter flight 
crew prior to the conduct of-retrieval operations. 
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4.0 RECOMMENDED SAFETY CRITERIA FOR CURRENT PAYLOADS 
Each payload classified as a current payload in paragraph 2. 1 
was analyzed to determine its hazardous materials and systems and then 
matched to the applicable safety criteria presented in paragraph 3. 2. 
A summary of the findings is covered in the following current payload 
hazard and safety criteria charts. A chart is included for each current 
payload. The data on these charts identify the hazard source, material, 
and system function that induces the hazard. The applicable safety 
criteria for each hazard source are specified by paragraph number. 
F Preceding pageblank 
33 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Extra Coronal Lyman Alpha Explorer (AS-02-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: 
HAZARD SOURCE 
High Pressure 
High Pressure 
Electrical 
Fire/Explosive 
Fire/Explosive 
Astronomy 
HAZARDOUS 
MATERIAL 
GN2 - 90. 7 kg 
GN 2 - 2Z. 6 kg 
610 W max., 
100 W dc 
standby 
Pyrotechnics 
Battery 
SYSTEM / FUNCTION 
Provides propulsion for 
orbit altitude mainte­
nance and station keepin 
Provides thrust for 
attitude control aid 
momentum dumping 
Electrical systems/ 
equipment test and 
checkout 
Solar Array Deployment 
Electrical Power 
APPLICABLE 
SAFETY CRITERIA 
3. Z. 4. 1 & 3. Z. 4. 2 
3. Z. 4. 1 & 3. 2. 4. Z 
3. 2. 2. 1 & 3. 2. 2. 2 
3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. 2. 3. 2 
3.2.2. 1 & 3. Z. Z. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Cosmic Background Explorer (AS-03-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Astronomy 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
High Pressure GN Z - 90. 7 kg 	 Provides propulsion for 3. 2. 4. 1 & 3. 2.4. Z 
orbit altitude mainte­
nance and station keepin 
High Pressure ON2 - 22.6 kg 	 Provides thrust for 3. Z. 4. 1 & 3. Z. 4. Zattitude control and 
momentum dumping 
Electrical 	 610 W max. , Electrical systems/ 3. Z. 2. 1 & 3. 2. 2. 2 
110 W dc equipment test and 
standby checkout 
Cryogenic LHe (TBD) 	 The telescope equip- 3.2.4. 1 & 3. 2.4. 2 
ment requires cryogenic 
cooling 
Fire/Explosive Batteries 	 Electrical Power 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3. Z.Z. Z 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics 	 Solar Array Deployment 3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. Z. 3. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND .SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Advanced Synchronous Met.eorological Satellite (EO-07-A) 
SCIENTIFIC. DISCIPLINE: Earth Observations 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Hypergolic Hydrazine 
- 89 kg 	 2Provides propellant for 3. Z.-4. 1, .3. Z.4. Z
attitude control system & 3..2. 5 
High Pressure GN z 	 Provides pressuriza- 3. 2.4. 1 & 3. 2. 4.2 
tion,:for hydrazine 
-attitude control system 
Electrical 360 Vac 	
_Electrical systems/ 3. 2.2. 1 & 3. 2. Z.2 
equipment test and 
checkout 
Fire/Explosive Batteries 	 Power storage 3.2. Z. 1 & 3. Z.2. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Earth Observatory Satellite (EO-08-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth Observations 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS 
MATERIAL 
Fire/Explosive Solid Propellant 
453. 6 kg 
Hypergolic 	 Hydrazine - 68 kg 
Fire/Explosive 	 Pyrotechnics 
High Pressure GN2 
Electrical 	 4000 W max., 30 W 
dc min. 
Fire/Explosive 	 Batteries 
SYSTEM / FUNCTION 
5 vm--Z model rocket 
engines serve as kick 
motor for transfer from 
Shuttle orbit to mission 
orbit 
Provides propulsion for 
orbit adjust capability 
Pyroactuated devices 
are required for Solar 
Array Deployment and 
Solid Propellant 
Igniters 
Provides pressurization 
for hydrazine orbit 
adjust propulsion 
system 
Electrical systems/ 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
Power storage 
APPLICABLE 
- SAFETY CRITERIA 
3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. 2. 3.2 
3. Z. 4. 1, 3. 2. 4. Z, 
& 3. 2. 5 
3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. 2. 3. Z 
3.2.4. 1 & 3.2.4. 2 
3. Z. Z. 1 & 3. 2. Z. Z 
3. Z. 2. 1 & 3. 2. Z. Z
 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Applications Explorer 	(Special Purpose Satellite) (EO-10-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth Observations 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Hypergolic Hydrazine - 19 kg 	 Provides propulsion for 3. 2. 4. 1, 3. Z. 4. Z, 
attitude control system & 3. 2. 5 
High Pressure GN z Provides pressurization 3.2.4 1 & 3.2.4. Z 
W0Go	 for hydrazine attitude 
control system 
Electrical 90 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3. 2. Z. 2 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics Solar Array Deployment 3. Zi 3.31 & 3. 2. 3. 2 
Fire/Explosive Batteries Power storage 3. 2. Z. I & 3. 2. 2. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: TIROSO (EO-lZ-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth Observations 
HAZARD SOURCE 	 HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Hypergolic Hydrazine 	 Provides propulsion for 3. Z. 4. 1, 3. Z. 4. 2, 
orbit injection correc- & 3. Z. 5 
tion 
High Pressure GN2 	 Provides pressurization 3.2.4. 1 & 3. Z. 4. 2 
for hydrazine propulsion 
system 
High Pressure GN Z 	 Provides thrust for 3. Z. 4. 1 & 3. Z. 4. 2 
attitude control system 
Electrical 350 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3. Z. Z. Z 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics 	 Solar Array Deployment 3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. 2. 3. 2 
Fire/Explosive Batteries 	 Power storage 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3. Z. Z. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Environmental Monitoring Satellite (EO-56-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth Observations 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 589 W Electrical systems/ 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3. 2. Z. Z 
equipment test and 
checkout 
Hypergolic Hydrazine - iZ. 45 kg 	 Provides propulsion for 3. Z. 4; 1, 3. 2. 4. Z, 
orbit injection correc- & 3. Z. 5 
tion 
High Pressure GN 	 Provides pressuriia- 3.2.4.1 & 3. 2. 4. 2 
tion for hydrazine 
propulsion system 
High Pressure GN i Provides thrust for 3. Z. 4. 1 & 3. Z. 4. 2 
attitude control system 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics Solar Array Deployment 3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. 2. 3. 2 
Fire/Explosive Battery Power storage 3. 2. 2. 1 &t3. 2. Z. Z 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Foreign Synchronous Meteorological Satellite (EO-57-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 140 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3. 2. 2. 1 & 3. Z. Z. Z 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
Hypergolic Hydrazine - 15.9kg Provides thrust for 3. 2. 4. 1, 3. 2.4. Z, 
- attitude control system & 3. 2. 5 
High Pressure GN Z 	 Provides, pressurization 3. 2.4. 1 & 3. 2. 4. Z 
for hydrazine attitude 
control system 
Fire/Explosive Battery 	 Power storage 3. 2.2. 1 & 3. 2.Z. Z 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Geosynchronous Operational Meteorological Satellite (EO-58-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth Observations 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 140 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3.2. Z. 2 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
Hypergolic Hydrazine - 15. 9 kg 	 Provides thrust for 3. 2. 4. 1, 3. Z. 4. Z,, 
attitude control system & 3. 2. 5 
High Pressure GN 	 Provides pressurization 3. 2. 4. 1 & 3. 2. 4. 2 
for hydrazine and 
attitude control system 
Fire/Explosive Batteries 	 Power storage 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3. 2.Z. Z' 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Earth Resources Survey Operational Satellite (EO-61-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth Observations 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 550 W 	 Electrical s.ysterris/ 3. 2. 2. 1 & 3. Z. 2. Z 
equipment test and 
checkout 
Hypergolic Hydrazine - 14. 5 kg 	 Provides thrust for 3. 2. 4. 1, 3. 2. 4. 1, 
orbit adjust capability & 3.2.5 
High Pressure GN 2 Provides pressurization 3. 2. 4. 1 & 3. 2.4. 2 
for hydrazine propulsior 
system 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics Solar Array Deployment 3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. 2. 3. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: GEOPAUSE (OP-01-A) 
SCIENTIFIC 
HAZARD SO
DISCIPLINE: Earth and O
URCE HAZARDOUS 
MATERIAL 
cean Physics 
SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICA
SAFETY 
BLE 
CRITERIA 
Electrical 410 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3. 2. 2. 1 & 3. Z. 2. 2 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
High Pressure GN Z - 115.6 kg" 	 Provides thrust for 3. Z. 4. 1 & 3.2.4. 2 
attitude control system 
Fire/Explosive Batteries 	 Power storage 3. Z. 2. 1 & 3.2. 2. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Gravity Gradiometer (OP-02-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth and Ocean Physics 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
163 W Electrical systems/ 3. 2. 2. 1 & 3. Z. 2. ZElectrical 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
High Pressure GN 2 - 847 kg Provides thrust for 3. 2. 4. 1 & 3. Z. 4. 2 attitude control system 
3. 2. Z. I & 3. 2. 2. ZFire/Explosive Batteries Power storage 
01 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Mini-LAGEOS (OP-03-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth and Ocean Physics 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS 
- SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Non-Hazardous
 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: SEASAT-B (OP-07-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Earth and 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS 
MATERIAL 
Ocean Ph sics 
SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICA
SAFETY 
BLE 
CRITERIA 
3. 2. 2. 1 & 3. 2. Z. 2Electrical 620 W Electrical systems/ 
equipment test and 
checkout 
Fire/Explosive Batteries Power storage 3. 2. 2. 1 & 3. 2. Z. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Pioneer Saturn Probe (PL-22 -A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Planetary I 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical T BD Electrical systems/ 3. z. 2. 1 & 3. 2. Z.2 
equipment test and 
checkout 
Radiological. Plutonium 238 RTG's 3. Z. 1. 1 & 3. Z. 1. Z 
Hypergolic Hydr~zine - 52. 4 kg Provides thrist for 3. 2. 4. 1, 3. 2. 4. Z, 
propulsion and attitude & 3. 2. 5, 
control system 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnic Various pyroactuated 3. Z. 3. 1 & 3. 2. 3. Z 
devices 
High Pressure GN Provides pressurizationfor hydrazine propulsion 3. 2.4. 1 & 3.2.4. 2 
system 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: INTERSAT (CN-51-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Communications /Navigation 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUSMATERIAL SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLESAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 4400 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3.2. 2. 2 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
Hypergolic Hydrazine 	 Provides thrust for 3. 2.4. 1, 3.2.4. 2, 
propulsion system & 3. Z. 5 
Fire/Explosive Cesium Ion 	 Provides thrust for 3. Z. 4. 1 & 3. 2.4. 2 
attitude control system 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics 	 Various pyroactuated 3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. 2.3. Z 
devices, Solar
 
High Pressure GN 2 	 Provides pressurization 3. 2.4. 1 & 3. 2.4. 2 
for the hydrazine 
propulsion system and 
cesium ibn system 
Fire/Explosive Battery 	 Power storage 3. 2. 2. 1 & 3. 2. 2. Z 
0 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: U.S. DOMSAT'A and'B (CN-5Z-A and CN-53-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Communications/Navigation 
HAZARD SOURCE 	 HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 4400 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3. 2. 2. 2 
e4uipment test and 
checkout
 
Hypergolic Hydrazine 	 Provides thrust for 3.2.4. 1, 3.2.4.2, 
propulsion system & 3. 2. 5 
Fire/Explosive Cesium Ion 	 Provides thrust for 3. 2.4. 1 S3.2.4. 2 
attitude control system 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics 	 Various pyroactdated 3. Z. 3. 1 & 3. Z. 3. 2 
devices, solar array 
deployment 
High Pressure GN 	 Provides pressurization 3. 2. 4. 1 & 3. 2. 4. Z 
for the attitude control 
system 
Fire/Explosive Battery 	 Power storage 3. 2. Z. 1 & 3. 2. 2. Z 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Traffic Management Satellite (CN-55-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Communications/Navigation 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 1100 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3.2. ?. 1 & 3. 2. 2.
equipment test and 
checkout 
Hypergolic Hydrazine 	 Provides tlrust for 3. 2, 4. 1, 3. 2. 4. 2, 
propulsion and attitude & 3. 2. 5 
control system 
High Pressure GN Z 	 Provides pressurization 3. 2. 4. 1 & 3. Z. 4. 2for hydrazine and 
propulsion system 
Fire/Explosive Batteries Power storage 3, Z. 2. 1 & 3. 2. 2. 2 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics Solar Array Deployment 3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. 2. 3. 2 
High Temperature Heaters 	 ECS 3. Z. Z. 1 & 3. Z. Z. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: Foreign Communications Satellite A (CN-56-A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Communications/Navigation 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
'MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 514 W 	 Electrical system/ 3. .2. 1 & 3. 2. 2.2 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
Ln Hypergolic Hydrazine - 58. 1 kg 	 Provides thrust for 3. 2, 4. 1, 3. Z. 4. Z0 
propulsion and attitude & 3. 2. 5 
control systems 
High Pressure GN 2 	 Provides pressurization 3. 2. 4. 1 & 3. 2.4. 2 
for hydrazine, 
propulsion system, and 
APS system 
Fire/Explosive Batteries 	 Power storage 3. 2.3. 1 & 3. Z. 3. 2 
Fire/Explosive Pyrotechnics 	 Solar Array Deployment 3. 2. 3. 1 & 3. Z. 3. 2 
CURRENT PAYLOAD HAZARDS AND SAFETY CRITERIA
 
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION: U. S. DOMSAT 'C" (CN - 58 - A) 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE: Communication/Navi ation 
HAZARD SOURCE HAZARDOUS SYSTEM / FUNCTION APPLICABLE 
MATERIAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Electrical 716 W 	 Electrical systems/ 3. Z.2. 1 & 3. 2. 2. Z 
equipment test and 
checkout
 
3. Z.4. 1, 3. 2. 4. Z,Hypergolic Hydrazine - 25. 1 kg 	 Provides thrust for 
attitude control system & 3. 2. 5 
Provides pressurization 3. Z.4. 1 & 3. 2.4. 2High Pressure 	 GN for hydrazine attitude 
control system 
Solar Array Deployment 3. Z.3. 1 & 3. 2. 3. 2Fire/Explosive 	 Pyrotechnics 
